Gianni Zucchet
7 December 2021
Kant’s Critique of Judgment: Revisited
Immanuel Kant proposed a foundation from which future philosophers were able to argue about aesthetics, and propose new ideas and viewpoints. His Critique of Judgment is the very root from which the tree of aesthetics has flourished, and expanded into modernity, by the watering of many present and past scholars. Kant separates his work into subsections which detail judgements of taste, their subjectivity, objectivity, the idea of the “Genius”, the role of fine art in society and morality, as well as solutions to issues in aesthetics.
In subsection 32, First peculiarity of a judgment of taste, Kant uses a flower as an example, or a symbol of beauty. His main argument is that we judge things based on our liking of them, that is, having the ability to cognize them, we give them a name which corresponds to the way our minds interpret them. The basis is the following: we dislike or like something based on our a priori cognition of said thing, which is notably independent; and it ought to be independent, from any further influence or bias towards the object. If our judgment upon the object has been tainted by perhaps a friend, or what the common argument is for an object, then our judgment is a posteriori; Kant labels this as “heteronomy” (Kant,10). His mention of heteronomy is an argument itself, he is arguing that we ought to base our arguments, and our taste of things, on our individual perception and cognition, as opposed to the general opinion. In aesthetics he argues for individual freedom, because otherwise art itself will become catered to groupthink rather than supporting the role of individuality and originality.
In the Second peculiarity of a judgment of taste, we are guided forward from the first peculiarity, into the realm of objectivity and individualism. Kant argues that “A judgment of taste… cannot be determined by bases of proof” (Kant, 11), this echoes the earlier argument that we should not base our taste in accordance with others, and reinforces the idea by making such a thing impossible. It is thus, not possible, to base our taste in popularity, Kant argues that a subject may: “act as if he liked it too, so that people will not think that he lacks taste” (Kant, 11). Importantly, he also brings the idea of doubt when considering the common taste of things, noting that an individual may begin to feel distrust towards his senses, if it does not match that of the populous. However, this does not mean the individual is incorrect, it might be that he requires more knowledge in order to assert a judgment of taste upon an object. It may be, however, that the majority has lesser knowledge, and his distaste for a popularly liked thing, is more accurate. This is especially important in modernity, as art in popular culture, through technology, has begun catering to the “common man” and not the studied, knowledgeable one. Many knowledgeable individuals may feel at odds, and feel doubt, however, I argue that popular culture has become flooded with unfulfilling art, mainstream media is just that; mainstream.This time, Kant uses food as an example, as well as his reasoning on how the word “taste” came to be, namely, that an individual will not be able to believe that a certain food dish is good, until the hypothesis has been tested on one's own senses, predicated perhaps, by previous encounters with other foods.
Though Kant argues that judgments of taste cannot be objective, they are in essence subjective arguments; he makes a possibility for objective arguments in aesthetics. In turn, however, the argument is then no longer one of taste but one of logic, this is made possible by comparing judgments of taste among society, to find a universal opinion. Thus, if I specifically like the sunny days, and, I create a poll in which the majority of the planets’ population participates, and agrees with my judgment of taste, then the judgment can become a universal one, notably through logic, not taste. However, what’s striking about this, is that the sunny day I liked is not the same one that one of the pollers, let’s say someone in Dubai, saw and liked. This means that we now have a general perception of all sunny days, not just the specific one that a particular subject liked, this is the peculiarity that Kant argues, that we can make a general argument about the whole category from which a specific instance derives, and create a logical argument, again, not one of taste, since judgments of taste are about specific instances or objects.
In subsection 33 and 34 Kant begins to introduce the differences between rationalism and empiricism in judgments of taste, prior to this point he argues that sense perception is the main way judgments of taste come about. However, with the idea of the critic introduced, he then reconciles rationalism by giving the critic a purpose, this purpose is not to give us the correct “formula that we could then use” (Kant, 12) in judgments of taste, but rather, to critique the form of the object in order to broaden our senses when observing art. He places the role of the critic not critical towards the object, but rather, critical towards our interpretations of said object: “the transcendental critique criticizes our very ability to judge them.” (Kant, 12). Namely, this reconciliation is necessary for his arguments to be sound, otherwise, his propositions would destroy the role of the critic, since there is no objective judgment of taste. Furthermore, he labels the different ways of perceiving objects as “freedom” and “lawfulness” (Kant, 13), namely, empiricism and rationalism, and argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between the two. Kant believes in order to formulate an accurate judgment of taste, the work, or object, must be in favor of both sense perception and our rationalizing minds: “insofar as the imagination in its freedom harmonizes with the understanding in its lawfulness” (Kant, 13). Simply, a way to approach this argument is with time, observe an art piece for 10 seconds without trying to generate any rational thoughts, look away, but don’t ponder or try to recreate the piece, and then judge it. After that judgment, look back at the piece but this time for ten minutes, noticing more of the formal qualities and perhaps allowing for interpretation, who is the author? What medium did they use to create this? This is the most simplistic way to approach Kant’s argument, noting the difference between intuition and rationalism, and how they “reciprocally quicken each other” (Kant, 13).
In Deduction of judgments of taste, subsection 38, interestingly, Kant argues: “when, in judging an object of sense in general, we feel this pleasure… we must be entitled to require this pleasure from everyone” (Kant, 14). This argument explains the “entitlement” of the critic when he casts judgment on a work, as well as the innate justification that they endlessly try to express. Moreover, this would also explain why we are so keen on sharing our favorite film, music, or art pieces with people we like, so that they may be imbued with the same feeling of pleasure that we felt from it.
Kant then distinguishes art into two categories, mechanical and aesthetic, with aesthetic art falling under the category of either fine or agreeable art. These categories are created in order to label art more accurately, and I would argue that it is also so that an individual is not fooled into thinking agreeable art is fine art. Thus, Kant argues that the agreeable can be something as commonplace as background music, since it stimulates the mind, though the listener is not specifically intent on noticing and naming the chords and notes played, for that might make it fine art. One of the most important things to note at this point, is that Kant’s argument is focused on the individual, and what they can do, rather than what art can do for the individual. It is up to the individual to not only cognize works of art, but also to properly categorize and taste them, which is an ability whose muscle is built up over time through experience with art itself. That being said, countering my previous argument, art can indeed do something not only for the individual but for society as a whole, this is fine art, its role, and what distinguishes it from agreeable art. In the same example of background music, perhaps the conversation dies down and the individual does start noting the chords and notes with intent, if the individual then is moved to begin a conversation on the focus of musical chord progressions, and they speak generally about the effects on different chords on the psyche, then it is fine art; since it was able to not only create conversation, but also, someone at the table may grow wise from the rich conversation, and go on to make music, that is the effect that fine art has on the individual, and importantly, the effect an individual can create when able to adeptly cognize a work of fine art and share it. Kant’s argument on this is that fine art: “furthers, even though without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to facilitate social communication” (Kant, 16). To add to Kant and end the quote I would add that it not only facilitates social communication but also advances it, and its effects are an evolutionary catalyst to society.
On the origin of fine art, Kant argues that it is the product of genius, however, he doesn’t seem to be using this as an adjective to describe someone, rather, it is an inherent, passive, quality that some individuals possess, which allows them to create fine art. It is important to note that genius is not a skill, it is an inherent talent, it cannot be imitated, or learned, according to Kant. Simply, fine art, or the work of genius, must possess three distinct qualities, it must be original, it must serve as a model for future works, and it’s creation must be inexplicable (Kant, 17). Notable is the idea of imitation, since that is the most popular form of content creation in modernity, we see, and through technology, individuals imitate others to gain clout, money, or fame. That being said, it is not the work of genius, but rather, a transient rebellious phase that is unfortunately praised and revered in the contemporary. Moreover, Kant makes many references to nature, the natural, he uses “nature” to describe that which is unknown, or unexplainable. It is not metaphysics, however, since the effects of fine art are conscious and interchangeable. He names the idea of the genius as a product of nature, and fine art a product of nature as well, and argues that fine art must appear to be natural, and free from constraint, and although it may follow strict guidelines it must seem like it is not following any at all. I believe the reason for this, is that if art seems to be following guidelines, we will, instead of being touched sensibly by the work, focus too much on the formal qualities rather than the message “nature” is sending us.
In the final subsection, 59, Kant makes the assertion, logically, that beauty must be a symbol of morality, as well as a morally good thing. Initially, to express this, he differentiates between the ideas of Schemata and Symbolic, which are “intuitions supplied for a priori concepts” (Kant, 31). Furthermore he uses the failure of extremism as the result of failing to reconcile between the schemata and the symbolic, pointing to a devoutly religious person as lacking schemata, and a deist as lacking the symbolic quality of life. This invokes the earlier argument that there must be an equilibrium between the intuitive and the rational, in order to gain the most understanding out of things, an extremely intuitive person gets no results, and an extremely rational one lacks the flavor that nature has to offer. His argument for beauty as a moral symbol and a morally good thing, is based on four ideas. One, that beauty is something we enjoy prior to any ideas, biases, or concepts, and inexplicably so. Second, that beauty does not require “interest”, it may cause further interest, but our initial apprehension on something beautiful could be sudden and without prior planning. Most importantly, third, that beauty allows the mind, as previously discovered in subsection 34, to free itself, and harmonize between the lawful and the sensible. Fourth, without truth and knowledge, when we like something we deem it as universally liked by everyone who is lucky enough to share the experience of apprehending it. Furthermore, as the nail to the coffin, Kant also mentions that the way we describe beauty is the same way we describe that which is morally good: “We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or landscapes cheerful and gay… because they arouse sensations in us that are somehow analogous to the consciousness we have in a mental state produced by moral judgments.” (Kant, 33). Thus, we must reconcile the rational and the intuitive, because they should not be at odds, but rather, assist each other in finding that which is beautiful, which will then allow us the ability to identify moral goodness; spearheading freedom, individuality, and the gifts that nature has bestowed upon us.
Works Cited
Cazeaux, Clive. The Continental Aesthetics Reader. Routledge, 2011.